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Abstract
In this article, we challenge the usefulness of “attention” as a unitary construct and/or neural system. We point out that the concept
has toomanymeanings to justify a single term, and that “attention” is used to refer to both the explanandum (the set of phenomena in
need of explanation) and the explanans (the set of processes doing the explaining). To illustrate these points, we focus our discussion
on visual selective attention. It is argued that selectivity in processing has emerged through evolution as a design feature of a
complex multi-channel sensorimotor system, which generates selective phenomena of “attention” as one of many by-products.
Instead of the traditional analytic approach to attention, we suggest a synthetic approach that starts with well-understood mecha-
nisms that do not need to be dedicated to attention, and yet account for the selectivity phenomena under investigation. We conclude
that what would serve scientific progress best would be to drop the term “attention” as a label for a specific functional or neural
system and instead focus on behaviorally relevant selection processes and the many systems that implement them.
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Introduction
“Everyone knows what attention is” (James, 1890) is one of
the most popular quotes fromWilliam James and certainly the
most famous statement about human attention.1 We argue,
however, that the overuse and popularity of this statement in
cognitive research has been detrimental to progress – that in
fact, no one knows what attention is. More specifically, we
argue that the concept of “attention” is one of the most mis-
leading and misused terms in the cognitive sciences. In the
present paper, we stake the position that the term “attention”
should be abandoned and the nature of the research in this area
be re-conceptualized to focus on the subsets of processes and
mechanisms that lead to task-specific performance. Similar
positions have been proposed and discussed previously (see
Anderson, 2011; Di Lollo, 2018; Hommel & Colzato, 2015;
Krauzlis, Bollimunta, Arcizet, & Wang, 2014; Mole, 2011).
The present paper reaffirms and expands this position by plac-
ing particular and new emphasis on the interconnected and
integrative nature of the human sensorimotor information pro-
cessing systems. This emphasis on integrated sensori-
cognitive-motor processes takes inspiration from the synthetic
approach to understanding “cognition” (Hommel & Colzato,
2015) and a proposed phylogenetic refinement of the scientific
approach to understanding behavior (Cisek, 2019 [this issue]).
In the present paper, we start by discussing and outlining
the central problem with the way “attention” has been concep-
tualized and studied thus far. We make the case for adopting a
synthetic approach to studying cognitive phenomena wherein
the focus is on the subset of processes and mechanisms that
have been attributed to and investigated under the umbrella of
1 Note that William James’ own approach to attention was mainly concerned
with phenomenology, an aspect of attention that we do not further consider in
this article given the modern functional and neural approaches we address
instead.
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“attention,” rather than on “attention” as one overarching con-
cept. To bolster our analysis of the state of affairs, we present
two test cases. In the first, we examine the debate about the
conceptual distinction between attention and intention, and
show that this debate fails to adequately account for the avail-
able data. In the second, we review research on selection and
reward history to show how conventional analytic approaches
to solving this problem are ineffective. As an alternative to the
analytic approach, we provide a brief review of the phyloge-
netic evolution of the human brain (for an expanded account,
see Cisek, 2019 [this issue]) and show how selective attention
emerged as just one necessary consequence of the challenges
facing animals behaving in the natural world. In the end, we
conclude that the traditional analytic attempt to lump many
diverse empirical observations under one common umbrella
called “attention” and to try to explain all of them by referring
to one coherent attentional system has actually failed, and
should be replaced by a more synthetic approach. This syn-
thetic approach focuses on, and starts with, ecologically rele-
vant mechanisms and processes and then tries to account for
as many phenomena (“attentional” or not) as possible.
The concept of attention
We are not the first to raise concerns about problems with
the term “attention.” Multiple authors have highlighted
the tendency to reify attention, creating circular explana-
tions for empirical results (Anderson, 2011; Di Lollo,
2018). Another common criticism is that multiple process-
es underlie what is typically labeled as “attention” (Di
Lollo, 2018; Hommel & Colzato, 2015). Mole (2011)
highlights that James’ statement came at the time where
there was debate among theorists as to whether the main
role of attention was in thinking, perceiving, or acting.
James’ contemporary, F.H. Bradley, produced one of the
earliest criticisms of the concept of attention, titling his
essay “Is There Any Special Activity of Attention.” In
brief, his position was that there were too many examples
of phenomena labeled “attention”, with little concern
about the processes underlying such phenomena
(Bradley, 1886). Now, over 130 years later, there is a
continued and heightened need to question the role of
“attention”, the use of the term “attention,” and a search
for what “attention” is (e.g., Busemeyer, Gluth,
Rieskamp, & Turner, 2019; Gottlieb, 2012). We reaffirm
these positions and further suggest that compartmentaliz-
ing “attention” and then searching for the “attentional
system” hinders the development of a comprehensive un-
derstanding of human behavior because it ignores inte-
grated, parallel, and reciprocal relationships among senso-
ry, cognitive, and action processes.
Before we explain our main position and arguments,
we would like to emphasize that the theoretical problems
that we highlight are particularly visible with respect to
the concept of attention, but by no means restricted to
that concept (Hommel, 2019a). For example, very similar
arguments to those that we present in the following have
been put forward to question the concept of memory.
Decades of research on human memory have seen an
ever-increasing number of memory systems that were
thought to represent separable aspects of memory perfor-
mance, which then were thought to be explained by the
existence of corresponding memory systems, with rather
limited contributions to a mechanistic understanding of
the underlying processes (Bechtel, 2008). As recent con-
siderations suggest, however, the various types of mem-
ory may not at all reflect the operations of separable
dedicated systems, but rather stand for different
byproducts of normally functioning cognitive systems
(Buckner & Schacter, 2004), and emerged at different
times during the evolution of our species (Murray,
Wise, & Graham, 2017). Similar arguments have been
put forward for the concept of emotion (Barrett, 2017;
Hommel, 2019b) and may be developed for other con-
cepts as well, including “cognition” itself (Cisek, 2019).
We focus here on attention because we believe that at
least some of the related phenomena are best understood
in terms of the kinds of interactions between sensory,
motor, and cognitive phenomena that are the focus of
this special issue.
Theorizing about human attention suffers from at least
three main problems. First, the concept of attention invites
misconceptions of one coherent set of cognitive or neural
operations, depending on one’s level of analysis, that all
contribute to what we call “attention” (e.g., Kahneman,
1973). Second, the concept of “attention” can also easily
be misunderstood as both an important explanandum that
psychology is rightly expected to explain and the
explanans that is supposed to form the explanation – thus
rendering the latter a pseudo-explanation. And, third, the
concept is thought to distinguish a particular set of cog-
nitive or neural operations from other, seemingly different
sets of operations, such as those related to decisions, in-
tentions, motivations, emotions, and, of particular rele-
vance to the present special issue, action planning and
execution. As we show in the expanded discussion of
these three points in the following paragraphs, all these
assumptions are incorrect.
First, let us start by considering which phenomena re-
searchers have, historically speaking, been trying to explain
when using the term “attention.”According to some tradition-
al and conventional views, “attention” is the set of cognitive/
neural mechanisms responsible for maximizing the efficient
utilization of our limited capacities to process, store, and
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retrieve information. However, consultancy of introductory
textbooks (e.g., Eysenck & Keane, 2000) and the internet
reveals a dramatic variety of abilities attributed to attention:
the ability to select external events for further internal process-
ing (focused attention); ignore misleading information and/or
an irrelevant location (selective attention); process irrelevant
information (involuntary attention); selectively integrate in-
formation belonging to one event within and across sensory
modalities (feature integration); prioritize processing of events
from a particular location (spatial attention); systematically
search for a target event (visual search); perform multiple
tasks at the same time (divided attention); control the spatial
parameters of eye movements (selective attention for action);
prioritize one goal over others (goal-centered attention); pri-
oritize one object, memory item, or conscious representation
over others (object-centered attention); and consolidate infor-
mation for later use and concentrate in anticipation of a pos-
sible event over some time (sustained attention). At face value,
it seems highly unlikely that the same set of functional/neural
mechanisms are involved in, and responsible for, this broad
variety of phenomena (Allport, 1993), and a bulk of behav-
ioral and neural evidence confirms that most subfunctions can
be dissociated from each other (e.g., Fan, McCandliss,
Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). Accordingly, it is unsurpris-
ing that no theory has been suggested so far that comes even
close to providing a coherent account of all phenomena sailing
under the label of “attention.”
Second, the term “attention” is often used to capture both
the problem and the solution of cognitive processing; i.e., to
describe both the phenomenon one aims to explain and the
mechanism proposed to provide the explanation. For instance,
the term attention is used to refer to the consequences of both
“voluntary” and “involuntary” factors in favoring the repre-
sentation of one event having a stronger impact on decision
making and action than representations of other events (e.g.,
Yantis, 1998). But the concept of attention is also used to refer
to the system, mechanism, or ability to deal with (or avoid) the
consequences of such unequal potencies of representations to
drive behavior (e.g., Broadbent, 1958). Along the same lines,
attention is considered by some to represent the critical capac-
ity limitation, the cognitive bottleneck that needs to be
accounted for and explained (e.g., Pashler & Johnston,
1998), while still others consider attention to be the cognitive
means to deal with such bottlenecks (e.g., Bundesen, 1990).
These conceptual confusions have created a situation in which
it is no longer clear what the to-be-explained problem actually
is (do we have a cognitive bottleneck that we need to make the
best of, or do we have too much information we need to
choose from?), and whether attention is a concept that refers
to the problem or to the solution. This runs into the danger that
research and theorizing on attention is based on circular rea-
soning (attentional phenomena are explained by assuming and
pointing to attentional systems) rather than on a deeper
mechanistic understanding of how the observed phenomena
are causally produced (Krauzlis et al., 2014).
Third, research on attention has followed, and suffered
from, the common analytical approach to psychological func-
tioning (see Hommel & Colzato, 2015, for a more detailed
discussion of this issue). The analytic approach comprises a
search for an exhaustive definition (which, given the diversity
of the subfunctions of attention, is impossible), the identifica-
tion of assumed subfunctions (e.g., overt vs. covert, early vs.
late, focused vs. divided, voluntary vs. automatic attention,
etc.) with separable functional and neural processes, and the
concentration of research on tasks and subfunctions rather
than actual processes. The problem of this analytic approach
is that it underestimates and overlooks commonalities be-
tween subfunctions and, in a wider perspective, commonali-
ties with other concepts. For instance, the very fact that we use
concepts like attention, decision making, intention, emotion,
and motivation in different situations and theoretical contexts
by no means implies that the underlying functional and neural
processes are different and separable. Indeed, attempts to sys-
tematically distinguish the processes “underlying” attention
from the processes that do not, often fail to produce any co-
herent consensus. In the following section, we outline one
exemplar case of the failure of the analytic approach – the
attempt to separate “attention” from “intention.”
Attention versus intention: A failed
dichotomy
Most researchers agree that the posterior parietal cortex repre-
sents the core of the neural substrate of selective attention, and
is a key node of an “attentional network” (Corbetta &
Shulman, 2011; Posner & Dehaene, 1994; Ptak, 2012). In
particular, individual neurons in the posterior parietal cortex
appear to reflect the locus of attention (Bisley & Goldberg,
2010; Robinson, Goldberg, & Stanton, 1978) and parietal
damage often leads to phenomena of spatial neglect
(Bartolomeo, 2007; Corbetta & Shulman, 2011). However, a
separate line of research implicates these same regions of the
brain in processes related to movement control (Mountcastle,
Lynch, Georgopoulos, Sakata, & Acuna, 1975; Snyder,
Batista, & Andersen, 1997). In particular, regions of the pos-
terior parietal cortex are strongly and reciprocally intercon-
nected with parts of the frontal lobe that are involved in the
planning and guidance of movement (Johnson, Ferraina,
Bianchi, & Caminiti, 1996; Markov et al., 2014), individual
neurons are strongly modulated by the type of action per-
formed with respect to identical stimuli (Cui & Andersen,
2007; Snyder et al., 1997), and inactivation of the posterior
parietal cortex causes biases in free-choice tasks
(Christopoulos, Kagan, & Andersen, 2018), but not decisions
based on visual evidence (Katz, Yates, Pillow, & Huk, 2016).
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These apparently contradictory findings have fueled a heat-
ed and persistent debate, now in its fifth decade, on whether
the posterior parietal cortex is involved in guiding “attention”
or whether it reflects the individual’s “intention.”As is typical
for the dominant analytical approach to psychological science,
researchers have tried to resolve this debate by defining the
concepts of attention and intention in ways that make them
appear mutually exclusive: “Attention” is what restricts the
inflow of sensory information to cognition, what enters con-
scious thought for further processing, whereas “intention” is
the output of cognition, the will (free or otherwise) to perform
a specific action. Defined in this way, the two appear like
distinct concepts that must be dissociable through careful ex-
perimental design. And yet, after decades of work by some of
the world’s most accomplished neuroscientists, a clear disso-
ciation of the function of posterior parietal cortex remains
elusive. A prominent review expressed this frustration many
years ago, suggesting that “current hypotheses concerning pa-
rietal function may not be the actual dimensions along which
the parietal lobes are functionally organized; on this view,
what we are lacking is a conceptual advance that leads us to
test better hypotheses” (Culham & Kanwisher, 2001).
To escape this rather uncomfortable state of affairs, some
researchers have argued for a more integrative view on atten-
tion and intention. A particularly promising approach is the
pre-motor theory, which argues that shifts of attention are
triggered by sub-threshold saccadic commands in oculomotor
areas and, conversely, shifts of attention in space lead to action
planning (e.g., Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umilta, 1987).
Support for the former idea has come from a large number of
observations including: (a) behavioral studies showing that
attention and eye movements are strongly linked behaviorally
(e.g., Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher,
& Blaser, 1995; Sheliga, Riggio, & Rizzolatti, 1995); (b)
fMRI studies of visual attention showing activation in eye-
movement areas for attention tasks (e.g., Beauchamp, Petit,
Ellmore, Ingeholm, & Haxby, 2001; Corbetta et al., 1998;
Nobre, Sebestyen, & Miniussi, 2000) and for movement acti-
vation (decoding) in retinotopically defined visual cortex dur-
ing movement tasks (Gallivan, Chapman, Gale, Flanagan, &
Culham, 2019); (c) stimulation studies showing that activation
of neurons in the superior colliculus (SC), frontal eye field
(FEF), and lateral intraparietal area (LIP) can change the focus
of attention (Cavanaugh &Wurtz, 2004; Cutrell & Marrocco,
2002; Moore & Fallah, 2001; Muller, Philiastides, &
Newsome, 2005); and (d) neurological studies of patients with
attentional disorders following damage to the frontal cortex,
parietal cortex, or midbrain (e.g., Husain & Kennard, 1996;
Posner, Cohen, & Rafal, 1982; Posner, Rafal, Choate, &
Vaughan, 1985; Sapir, Soroker, Berger, & Henik, 1999). Of
particular relevance to the present purpose are behavioral stud-
ies revealing that perceptual discrimination at the goal location
of an upcoming saccade is improved (Deubel & Schneider,
1996; Gersch, Kowler, & Dosher, 2004; Hoffman &
Subramaniam, 1995; Peterson, Kramer, & Irwin, 2004).
These studies demonstrate there is preferential processing of
stimuli at the goal of a saccade just before the onset of the eye
movement (presumably because “attention” has been shifted
to the goal location).
Other research has extended the study of these action-
attention interactions to manual actions, showing that plan-
ning and performing reaching and grasping movements prior-
itizes the processing of the target objects of these movements
(e.g., Pratt & Abrams, 1994; Rizzolati, Riggio, & Sheliga,
1994; Tipper, Lortie, & Baylis, 1992; see also Wu, 2014).
Even when the eyes remain fixated, perceptual discrimination
is better at the to-be-reached goal than non-goal locations
(Baldauf & Deubel, 2008; Baldauf, Wolf, & Deubel, 2006;
Deubel & Schneider, 2003; Deubel, Schneider, & Paprotta,
1998; Khan, Song, & McPeek, 2011). The “attentional im-
pact” or prioritized processing associated with intended future
movements goes beyond mere spatial prioritization because
other studies have shown that moving or planning to move
also facilitates the detection of action-related features of the
object targeted by the movement. For example, preparing for a
grasping movement facilitates the detection of size oddballs,
while preparing for a pointing movement facilitates the detec-
tion of location oddballs (Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz, 2007;
see also Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umiltà, 1999). Other
studies (Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; Moher, Anderson, &
Song, 2015; Tipper, Meegan, & Howard, 2002; Weir et al.,
2003; Welsh & Pratt, 2008; Welsh & Zbinden, 2009; see also
Gallivan, Barton, Chapman, Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2015;
Glazebrook, Welsh, & Tremblay, 2016; Yoxon, Constable, &
Welsh, 2019 [this issue]) show that the processing of specific
object features can be prioritized depending on the relative (i.e.,
task/action-specific) salience of those features for the to-be-
performed action. That is, the same feature (e.g., orientation)
can be prioritized in one action context (e.g., grasping), but not
another action context (e.g., pointing). Hence, it is neither phys-
ical stimulus properties nor action goals alone that generate
selectivity, but rather selectivity is shaped by the reciprocal
and iterative interactions between these factors. These findings
thus suggest that multiple functional and neural systems are
involved in selective attention.
In addition to the interactive nature of stimulus properties
and action goals in determining selection and prioritization of
locations and features, it does not seem that selection stops
solely within any putative attentional system. Indeed, neural
activity related to multiple simultaneously active intentions to
act at potential target locations, as well as the selection of the
final target, has been identified in various structures more
commonly associated with the planning and execution of ac-
tions, such as the dorsal premotor area, the parietal reach re-
gion, and the motor cortex (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005; Klaes,
Westendorff, Chakrabarti, & Gail, 2011; Pesaran, Nelson, &
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Andersen, 2008; Scherberger & Andersen, 2007; Song &
McPeek, 2010; Thura & Cisek, 2014). Behaviorally, the pres-
ence of multiple co-existing response representations and the
dynamic selection of target from non-target stimuli and ac-
tions is also expressed through the spatiotemporal character-
istics of reaching and grasping movements. Specifically, in-
stead of the efficient straight and direct movements that one
might anticipate if attentional selection had been completed
prior to the intention to act, the trajectories of hand and eye
movements veer towards or away from non-target stimuli de-
pending on the timing and salience of the non-target stimuli
(e.g., Chapman et al., 2010; Gallivan & Chapman, 2014;
Howard & Tipper, 1997; Moher et al., 2015; Neyedli &
Welsh, 2012; Song & Nakayama, 2006, 2008; Welsh, 2011;
Welsh & Elliott, 2004; Wispinski, Gallivan, & Chapman, in
press). Thus, the characteristics of the physically executed
action actually reflect the “attentional” state of the target and
non-target stimuli. Collectively, these data indicate that atten-
tion, selection, and intention are not readily separated in a set
of discrete serial processes, but are more dynamic and contin-
uous in nature and embedded within a densely interconnected,
parallel processing system.
While more work needs to be done to synthesize these
neural and behavioral observations into a coherent framework,
it seems clear (to us) that the conceptual distinction between
attention and intention is not sufficient to account for the va-
riety of findings discussed here. The distinction fails to pro-
vide a meaningful contribution or framework for sorting the
available findings into useful categories to stimulate further
theorizing, and it also clashes with the demonstration of so
many interactions between input processing and output gen-
eration. But what is the solution to this and the many other
conceptual problems we are encountering in thinking about
human attention (e.g., controlled vs. automatic processing;
facilitation vs. inhibition, etc.)?
A failed analytic solution: Selection
and reward history
As noted above, the dominant analytical approach to psycho-
logical functioning begins with an exhaustive search for a
definition of a concept, including the borders of where it dif-
fers from other concepts. So, to understand “attention,” one
would tend to first define how it differs from “intention,”
“decision-making,” “motivation,” etc. In view of a failure of
this approach, as is obvious for the case of attention versus
intention, two reactions are to be expected. First, one might
consider the previous attempts to define attention and inten-
tion as flawed and try to improve the definitions by further
reducing the conceptual overlap between the two concepts.
For instance, one may further reduce the concept of attention
to mere input selection and the concept of intention to output
selection. Given that this would make it no longer apparent
that such a reduced version of “attention” has anything to do
with other “attentional” functions like integration, orientation,
or vigilance, this would eventually call for dropping the con-
cept – and the same argument holds for “intention.” On the
positive side, this would prevent researchers from trying to
find commonalities in processes and substrates that are unlike-
ly to be found. On the negative side, however, there is no
theoretical justification to pick just these functional aspects
but not others. What looks like a definitional issue thus be-
comes a theoretical bias that is lacking justification.
Alternatively, one might search for hybrid approaches that
allow for additional components and factors. A typical ap-
proach of this sort was the resource theory of attention, which
triggered heated debates in the 1970s and 1980s (Kahneman,
1973; Navon, 1984). While the first approaches were simple
and elegant by assuming one kind of resource that needs to be
distributed over all mental work, the attempt to integrate an
increasing number of unpredicted findings led to the invention
of increasing numbers and types of separate resources. In the
end, this made systematic predictions impossible (Navon,
1984), which is the main reason why this approach no longer
plays an important role – except in the field of ego-depletion,
where history seems to repeat itself (Friese, Loschelder,
Gieseler, Frankenbach, & Inzlicht, in press). The main reason
why hybrid approaches that simply lump together different
factors are not overly successful rests in the fact that the re-
spective factors are not truly integrated into a coherent
framework.
A similar tendency can be seen with respect to selective
attention, where Awh, Belopolsky, and Theeuwes (2012) have
tried to integrate findings that are no longer consistent with the
historical distinction between endogenous attention, which
represents the prioritized processing of stimuli to which the
agent “wants” to attend, and exogenous attention, which rep-
resents the prioritized processing of stimuli that are unrelated
to the present action and goals. The history of distinguishing
between endogenous and exogenous attention is very similar
to the distinction between attention and intention. Each started
out by trying to improve definitions about what the concept
referred to, only to be faced later with the inability to system-
atically sort the available findings into two distinct categories.
In a nutshell, endogenous attention is sometimes too automat-
ic and exogenous attention is sometimes too dependent on the
current prioritized stimulus feature or action goal to make this
dichotomy fruitful and tenable (Awh et al., 2012; Folk,
Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Hommel & Wiers, 2017).
Awh et al. suggest solving this problem by adding a third
variable – selection history – to the list of factors. In particular,
the idea is that goals (the factor responsible for endogenous
attention), salience (the factor responsible for exogenous at-
tention), and selection history (a factor that does not seem to fit
the previous dichotomy and is associated with previous
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selections and rewards generated by the selections) all con-
tribute to selectivity by sending their output to an integrative
priority map. Although this approach may account for many
of the available findings, we are not convinced that it really
solves the problem, but rather provides a patch that holds
concepts together and, in the end, prevents or misdirects the
search for suitable solutions. Instead, we suggest that a com-
plete dismantling of the concept of attention is required.
At first there does not seem to be anything wrong with the
idea that structures, or a singular structure, in the human cen-
tral nervous system are devoted to collecting and integrating
information that affects prioritized processing. One candidate
structure is the superior colliculus, which is thought to reflect a
priority map of stimuli in the visual field (Fecteau & Munoz,
2006). Importantly, and as required from the view that selec-
tivity for behavioral relevance is the purview of the entire
moving body, the superior colliculus is involved not just in
eye movements, but in orienting movements of the eye, head,
body, and hand (Gandhi & Katnani, 2011; Stuphorn,
Hoffmann, & Miller, 1999). Emphasizing this point, Song
and colleagues (Song, Rafal, & McPeek, 2011; Song &
McPeek, 2015) found that the superior colliculus plays a caus-
al role in target selection during manual reaching tasks,
supporting the idea that the superior colliculus is part of a
general-purpose target selection/orientation system
(Nummela & Krauzlis, 2010; Song et al., 2011). On the other
hand, there is no need to assume that the superior colliculus is
the only map that integrates relevant information to steer at-
tention, nor is it necessary to assume that all available infor-
mation is integrated into that one map. As we argue below, the
human brain can be considered to have many sources of se-
lectivity and, in the end, it is the brain as a whole that does the
integration. Given that this integration is the explanandum
(the to-be-explained phenomenon), postulating the existence
of one map that has no other function than achieving this
integration seems to be one more attempt to “explain” a psy-
chological phenomenon by positing the existence of a dedi-
cated system whose only purpose is to somehow create that
phenomenon.
Apart from this more general meta-theoretical problem,
adding one more factor to a model that just assumes that inte-
gration takes place without explaining how that can be done is
unlikely to guide further research. In the case of Awh et al.
(2012), one reason is that selection history overlaps consider-
ably with goal-induced endogenous selectivity and salience-
induced exogenous selectivity. For instance, the fact that plan-
ning and carrying out particular kinds of actions systematical-
ly facilitates the processing of particular object features (e.g.,
of size and orientation for grasping, location for reaching:
Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; Craighero et al., 1999; Fagioli
et al., 2007) is unlikely to be genetically determined, but rather
the consequence of learning and experience of selecting dif-
ferent features for grasping over the lifespan (Hommel, 2010).
Indeed, prioritizing shape and orientation when grasping ob-
jects makes more sense than prioritizing color because those
features are more likely to determine a successful or an unsuc-
cessful grasp. Hence, establishing a bias for shape and orien-
tation over color when grasping would be a functional adap-
tation. However, this influence implies that selection history
affects how goals impact (endogenous) attention. Along the
same lines, the relative salience of the visual dimension
changes substantially during the first years of life (e.g.,
Suchman & Trabasso, 1966), which at least opens the possi-
bility that selection history impacts salience.
While these arguments are fully consistent with Awh
et al.’s suggestion to consider selection history as a third factor
involved in attentional control, they also imply that the
resulting three factors are not independent but strongly over-
lapping and intertwined – both empirically and conceptually.
As we have tried to explain, these conceptual-overlap prob-
lems are unlikely to be resolved by more definitions. Rather,
what is needed is a theory that not only assumes that integra-
tion takes place but that explains how that integration works.
Another reason why just adding selection history as an
additional factor raises more questions than answers is that
the concept itself is unclear, particularly in its overlap with
other related factors beyond exogenous and endogenous con-
trol. One such factor that is intertwined with selection history
is reward history. It is uncontroversial that previously
rewarded stimuli receive preferential processing (Anderson,
Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2012), suggest-
ing that reward history is important in determining salience.
Conventionally, stimuli must have been selected in order for
the organism to have received a reward, thus conflating the
two concepts. Awh et al. (2012) appear to acknowledge this
tension, considering both previous reward and previous stim-
ulus selections to be exemplars of “selection history” while
facing the fact that selection history and reward history cannot
be identical (given that previous selections might not have
received reward). However, the fit of reward history into this
joint category is much less obvious than this theoretical inte-
gration suggests since reward history is itself likely composed
of many differentiable factors.
For instance, the preference for rewarding stimuli is stron-
ger when the larger expected gain of the stimulus is due to an
increased probability of receiving a reward than when there is
a lower cost of failure (Neyedli &Welsh, 2015b). This finding
suggests that what participants take to be rewarding is itself
multifaceted – not just the magnitude of the reward, but also
how likely it is that they will receive the reward. Furthermore,
across a series of reach-decision experiments, a multitude of
biasing factors have been observed including: reward value
and probability (Chapman, Gallivan, & Enns, 2015a), the best
option in a decision set (Wispinski, Truong, Handy, &
Chapman, 2017), current level of accumulated wealth
(Neyedli & Welsh, 2015a), the number of targets and not the
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perception of them (Milne et al., 2013), and how the number
of choice-options is represented (Chapman et al., 2014). The
problem here is similar to the one Awh et al. (2012) tried to
solve: the definition of the concept under investigation is too
restricted. In their case, endogenous and exogenous control
were insufficient to account for the variety of pheomenena
being ascribed to the concept of attention, so they added se-
lection history. Selection history is itself decomposable into
(at least) selection and reward history, and reward history is
itself decomposable even further. Thus, the nature and the
influence of reward is itself dependent on numerous contex-
tual factors and the expression of the confluence of these fac-
tors is not easily captured in a unitary construct.
The picture gets even more complicated when one con-
siders studies comparing the impact of rewards of equal
magnitude but in opposite directions (e.g., positive/gain
vs. negative/loss). For example, loss aversion, made fa-
mous by the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
shows that people treat potential losses as being more aver-
sive than equivalent gains are rewarding. Interestingly,
when decisions between positively and negatively reward-
ing stimuli are made rapidly (Chapman et al., 2015b),
asymmetries in choice behavior are also observed, but go
opposite to loss aversion. That is, in these situations, par-
ticipants appear to be disproportionately drawn toward op-
tions giving gains, while the aversive impact of loss-related
choices is attenuated. These findings highlight an addition-
al complication – that different biases are likely to operate
on different timelines. For instance, in the study of the
asymmetry in decisions to go for a good option versus
avoid a bad one, participants were biased toward positively
valanced targets 100 ms earlier than they were biased to
move away from negative ones (Chapman et al., 2015b).
This finding echoes related work showing that more time is
required to select optimally between visuomotor choices
when they differ based on negative value information com-
pared to when they differ based on the probability of re-
ward (Neyedli & Welsh, 2015b).
Taken together, these and other findings strongly suggest
that selection history is tightly interconnected with reward
history and that neither of these concepts are particularly well
understood. Hence, adding selection history to the two other
not well understood concepts of exogenous and endogenous
attention is unlikely to help much in understanding the mech-
anisms underlying human selective attention. To be clear, we
are not advocating an alternative theory at this point, but rather
we suggest an alternative theoretical perspective: Let us re-
place the analytical approach, which seeks to explain complex
phenomena by first carefully defining them and then
subdividing them into simpler elements, with a synthetic ap-
proach that considers how simple mechanisms and functional
processes, each of which is itself behaviorally relevant, can
together give rise to complex phenomena.
A synthetic approach
A synthetic approach is valuable only insofar as it synthesizes
elements that actually correspond to real biological processes
at both neural and functional levels, and it is a significant
challenge to figure out what those processes are. One power-
ful strategy for doing so – for keeping our synthesis close to
biological reality – is to use evolution as a guide. This guid-
ance can be done through a procedure of “phylogenetic refine-
ment,” whereby one progressively elaborates a theory about
how neural and behavioral processes evolved along a given
lineage, always respecting constraints about the neural modi-
fications and behavioral adaptations that appeared at each
stage (see Cisek, 2019 [this issue]). For this reason, here we
step away from the concept of “attention” and take a brief
detour into the history of how the relevant neural circuits
evolved in the lineage that leads to homo sapiens (humans).
While it is often very difficult to know why a given modifica-
tion took place in evolution, establishing what was the se-
quence of modifications can be constrained by a wealth of
comparative and developmental data, leading to strong and
testable hypotheses about how neural circuits and behavioral
abilities evolved together.
The evolutionary history of spatial interaction along the
primate lineage is a long and complex tale (Fig. 1). A major
advance occurred during the Cambrian epoch, over 500 mil-
lion years ago (Mya), with the elaboration of visually guided
orientation behaviors. Our simple chordate ancestors pos-
sessed a visual escape circuit that involved projections from
a single photosensitive patch in the rostral neural tube to a
midbrain structure called the tectum, which projected to the
spinal cord to generate locomotion (Lacalli, 1996, 2018). In
the lineage leading to vertebrates, the photosensitive patch
split into two lateral eye patches on both sides of the head
(Butler, 2000). Because these eye patches projected contra-
laterally to the tectum, which projected ipsilaterally to the
spinal cord, the circuit caused our ancestors to turn away from
salient visual stimuli such as the shadow from an approaching
predator (Fig. 2a). As the eye patches expanded, they folded
into cups and formed a lens (Lamb, 2013), resulting in a two-
dimensional retina that provided a topographic mapping of
external stimuli. The tectum expanded in parallel, with a
matched topographic map of space in its superficial layers
and gradients of downstream projections in its deep layers.
The result was an “action map” of oriented escape responses
to threatening stimuli at specific locations in the external
world.
Microstimulation studies reveal the presence of an orga-
nized map of oriented escape responses in the tectum of lam-
prey (Saitoh, Menard, & Grillner, 2007), a jawless fish whose
ancestors diverged from ours about 550 Mya. These studies
also reveal the presence of another action map, which lies
within the rostral region of the tectum. This map is sensitive
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to space in front of the animal, and projects mostly contra-
laterally to the spinal cord, thereby producing orientation and
approach actions (Jones, Grillner, & Robertson, 2009;
Kardamakis, Saitoh, & Grillner, 2015). It is this latter tectal
sub-circuit that is most relevant to attention and selection. In
the avoidance circuit, multiple stimuli can engage multiple
escape actions that can simply be averaged downstream to
produce adaptive avoidance behavior (Fig. 2b). In contrast,
averaging cannot work in an approach circuit, because the
average response to two stimuli will cause the animal to miss
both of them (Fig. 2c). Consequently, the approach circuit
must select between actions, such that one completely sup-
presses the other. This kind of selection could be
accomplished through lateral inhibition that produces “win-
ner-take-all” dynamics (Grossberg, 1973; Mysore &
Knudsen, 2011; Wang, 2002).
How is this related to attention? A few sentences after that
famous phrase we quoted above, James wrote that attention
“implies a withdrawal from some things in order to deal ef-
fectively with others.” That withdrawal from some stimuli to
interact with another stimulus is indeed accomplished, quite
literally, within the approach circuit of the rostral tectum. And
while these simple circuits for governing interactive behavior
may seem far removed from the higher cognition of humans,
they are indeed the precursors to the mechanisms that control
what has been called “selective attention.” The tectum is
Fig. 1 A reduced phylogenetic tree of bilaterally symmetric animals,
exclusively emphasizing the lineage that leads to humans. Branch
points represent some of the divergences between different lineages,
with timing estimated on the basis of molecular clock analyses (Erwin
et al., 2011). Thick lines indicate the presence of relevant fossil data
(paleobiodb.org). Small rectangles indicate the estimated latest timing
of innovations described in the boxes. Note that many branch points
and lineages are omitted for clarity. Silhouettes along the right are from
phylopic.org
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homologous to the human superior colliculus, which, as
discussed earlier, is strongly implicated in both orienting gaze
through eye and head movements and in controlling covert
attention when gaze is stationary (Basso & May, 2017).
Though much has developed in the central nervous system
and the world since our lineage diverged from lamprey in
the early Cambrian, both the approach and avoidance circuits
of the tectum are still present in fish (Herrero, Rodriguez,
Salas, & Torres, 1998) and in mammals (Comoli et al., 2012).
Eventually, our ancestors left the seas and some of them,
the amniotes, adapted to a fully terrestrial lifestyle. This adap-
tation was accompanied by an expansion and lamination of
the telencephalic pallium, an integrative olfactory, visual, and
somatosensory region that would eventually give rise to the
cerebral cortex (Aboitiz & Montiel, 2015; Striedter, 2005). In
all mammals, the neocortex consists of two sheets (Finlay &
Uchiyama, 2015), a dorsomedial sector that is spatially topo-
graphic and a ventrolateral sector that is non-topographic. In
primates, the former includes a medial and dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex, cingulate regions, all of the premotor, motor,
sensorimotor, and parietal cortex, as well as the retrosplenial
cortex. The latter includes parts of the lateral prefrontal cortex,
orbitofrontal cortex, and all of the limbic cortex and the tem-
poral lobe. Most relevant to the issue of attention is the
dorsomedial sector of the neocortex, which is organized into
a set of fronto-parietal circuits dedicated to different classes of
species-typical actions (Graziano, 2016; Kaas & Stepniewska,
2016). In early mammals (300 Mya), this system was proba-
bly quite limited and consisted simply of medial circuits con-
cerned with locomotion and lateral circuits concerned with
head and mouth movements (Kaas, 2017). Each of these cir-
cuits processed sensory information in an idiosyncratic man-
ner specialized for its specific type of action (e.g., space near
the legs for locomotion, space near the snout for ingestion)
and each projected to a specific set of relevant effectors. In a
sense, each circuit was an “actionmap” analogous to the much
older tectal systems for approach and avoidance, but guiding
the much wider repertoire of task-specific interactions avail-
able in the mammalian niche.
As the behavioral repertoire of mammals continued to ex-
pand, so did the dorsomedial neocortex, and there was a dif-
ferentiation and specialization of action-specific maps of sen-
sory space. In primates, expansion of the parietal cortex was
particularly dramatic, yielding a variety of idiosyncratic rep-
resentations of space particular to the needs of different action
types (Andersen, Snyder, Bradley, & Xing, 1997; Stein, 1992)
(see Fig. 3). For example, visually guided reaching actions
involve the medial intraparietal cortex (Cui & Andersen,
2007; Kalaska & Crammond, 1995), which represents targets
within reach with respect to the direction of gaze and the
position of the hand (Buneo, Jarvis, Batista, & Andersen,
2002; Gallivan, Cavina-Pratesi, & Culham, 2009), and is in-
terconnected with frontal regions controlling reaching, such as
the dorsal premotor cortex (Johnson et al., 1996; Wise,
Boussaoud, Johnson, & Caminiti, 1997). Grasp control in-
volves the anterior intraparietal area (Baumann, Fluet, &
Scherberger, 2009), which is sensitive to object shape and is
interconnected with grasp-related frontal regions such as the
ventral premotor cortex (Nakamura et al., 2001; Rizzolatti &
Luppino, 2001). The control of gaze involves the lateral
intraparietal area (Snyder, Batista, & Andersen, 2000), which
represents space in a retinotopic frame (Colby & Duhamel,
1996; Snyder, Grieve, Brotchie, & Andersen, 1998), and is
interconnected with frontal regions controlling gaze, such as
the frontal eye fields and the superior colliculus (Paré &
Wurtz, 2001) – taking advantage of the tectal orientation/
approach system that has been steering animals since the
Cambrian epoch.
Fig. 2 Circuits for avoidance and approach in a hypothetical early
vertebrate. (a) In the avoidance circuit, visual information from the
lateral eyes arrives in the contralateral tectum, which projects
ipsilaterally to the midbrain locomotor regions. Thus, if a stimulus falls
on the left eye, the locomotion will tend to turn to the right until
stimulation is balanced and the body is oriented away from the
stimulus. (b) Spatial averaging of escape directions (numbered arrows)
away from two threatening stimuli (black stars) is an effective response.
(c) For approach actions, spatial averaging is maladaptive, making
winner-take-all dynamics necessary. B and C reused with permission
from Cisek (2019)
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In many situations, different fronto-parietal action streams
will compete against each other. For example, one must make
an all-or-none decision as to whether to burrow at the roots of
one tree or instead walk over to another tree. In other situa-
tions, however, different fronto-parietal streams will be coor-
dinated. For example, when a head/snout orientation system
points at a target, that target is then made available to other
behaviors, such as burrowing or biting. This availability be-
comes particularly important in primates, which evolved from
tree-climbing insect eaters and developed large eyes with a
central, high-resolution fovea, and acquired a taste for fruit.
In such animals, the system for controlling the orientation of
gaze takes on an executive role for many other visually guided
behaviors. Selecting a target for gaze becomes part of
selecting what to reach for or which branch to grasp to climb.
It comes to serve much of the role traditionally ascribed to
“selective attention.” Indeed, it has long been proposed that
selective attention, both overt and covert, is closely related to
the gaze orientation system and involves the same neural
structures (Corbetta et al., 1998; Rizzolatti et al., 1987), in-
cluding the posterior parietal cortex, the frontal eye fields, and
the superior colliculus.
And so, this brief foray into the long journey of primate
evolution has brought us back to selective attention and to the
posterior parietal cortex, but with a different perspective on
both. The question is not whether the posterior parietal cortex
plays a role in something called “attention” or something else
called “intention,” but how the posterior parietal cortex fits
within a broader system that enables animals to select and
control interactions with their environment to achieve their
goals and avoid negative outcomes. The phylogenetic per-
spective suggests that the primate posterior parietal cortex is
part of a topographically organized dorsomedial neocortical
system for visually guided interactions oriented with respect
to objects in the world (Cisek, 2007). This system is organized
as parallel sensorimotor streams, each contributing to a spe-
cific type of action within the animal’s behavioral repertoire,
whose activity is orchestrated through selective invigoration,
energization, or drive from the basal ganglia and other struc-
tures (Cisek & Thura, 2018; Grillner, Robertson, &
Stephenson-Jones, 2013). Within each of these fronto-
parietal action streams, target selection occurs through
winner-take-all dynamics taking place in an idiosyncratic spa-
tial reference frame specific to each given type of action (e.g.,
retinotopic for eye movements). One of those streams is con-
cerned with orienting gaze through eye and head movements,
and appears to have an executive role simply because so many
of the other streams rely on high-resolution visual information
that is derived from the fovea. When an animal (including
humans) is placed in a laboratory situation and trained/
instructed to perform just one isolated aspect of complex nat-
ural behavior, what the researcher will observe in this region is
activity that appears to be related to what the researcher has
defined as “attention,” “intention,” or “decision-making,” de-
pending on the particular task variables that are being exper-
imentally manipulated. But it does not follow from these cor-
relations that there exists anything in the brain that can be
meaningfully delineated as an “attentional system” (or, for that
matter, an “intention system” or “decision system”). The key
insight is that the posterior parietal cortex is not part of an
Fig. 3 The primate cerebral cortex contains a set of parallel sensorimotor
streams in the dorsomedial regions (blue arrows), each involved in a
specific type of action using specific representations of space. All of
these use information on object identity and outcome value, computed
in the ventrolateral regions (red arrows), to select the actions most
relevant given the current behavioral context. AIP anterior intraparietal
area, FEF frontal eye fields, IT inferotemporal cortex, LIP lateral
intraparietal area, LPFC lateral prefrontal cortex, MIP medial
intraparietal area, OFC orbitofrontal cortex, PMd dorsal premotor
cortex, PMv ventral premotor cortex, V1 primary visual cortex
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“attention system” but, rather, that selective attention phenom-
ena are part of what the posterior parietal cortex produces as it
goes about its business of controlling goal-directed action.
Summary and conclusions
We thus conclude that selectivity emerged through evolution
as a design feature to enable efficient goal-directed action.
Such selectivity became necessary as the action repertoire of
the given line of organisms that led to humans increased. This
means that selectivity is an emerging property arising from a
myriad underlying processes, and the simple fact that humans
(and other species showing selective attention) evolved the
way they did, with selective attention being one of many
byproducts, next to “selective intention” and “selective deci-
sion making.” Here, we have primarily emphasized selection
mechanisms in the superior colliculus and parietal cortex, but
similar arguments can be made for other selection
mechanisms in other brain regions. For example, Krauzlis
et al. (2014) suggest how some types of “attentional” phenom-
ena could be products of value-based selection mechanisms of
the basal ganglia. If selectivity is a design feature that emerged
as the repertoire of behaviors increased in number and sophis-
tication (avoidance, approach, saccade, eat, reach, grasp, use
tools…), it would seem futile to search for a single dedicated
functional or neural subsystem generating selection. We feel
that this futility is the reason that attention research has so
many longstanding and rather fruitless debates about the true
origins and processes of selective attention. These debates are
commonly binary in nature because the debates start with the
assumption of one cause or singular central core system. As
this one cause is then increasingly challenged by additional
research findings, another, commonly opposite cause is
established… and the process and debate continues. We sus-
pect that none of these debates will come to an end, simply
because the proponents of all camps are “correct” in someway
and in some cases given that selectivity is a feature of the
system that has emerged from the interaction of many factors
across evolution.
And yet, we strongly feel that these debates do not move
our field forward; that they do not really increase our under-
standing of how “attentional phenomena” are generated.
Pursuing the analytic approach and trying to use one concept
like “attention” to explain all of these results (that is, as a
singular explanans) is problematic – the term invariably gets
spread so thin, across so many different findings, that it ends
up being too vague to have any empirical punch. Researchers
are right to pursue these as multiple explananda, but would be
wrong to seek or be forced to rule out only one explanans.
Rather, inasmuch as it is possible, one should seek to identify
the key mechanisms and processes at work and explain each
in turn.
In an analytic approach to science, one runs the risk of
becoming a slave to the concepts that have been generated.
Many researchers have taken terms like “attention,” “inten-
tion,” and “decision making” from everyday language and
expect this linguistic categorization to somehow map to iden-
tifiable mechanisms in the brain or functions. Of course, when
one starts to peer into actual neural functions, there is no clear
delineation, only a set of processes that interact to create se-
lectivity in the end. These processes interact not because they
belong to a dedicated system, but because the human brain
and body evolved this way and selectivity was a necessary
feature to achieve efficient behavior. Further, everything an
individual does throughout their life (distant and recent past)
creates, reinforces, and shapes selection: Turning to the left
makes us ignore stimuli on the right, picking one apple makes
us overlook the others, saying one word prevents us from
uttering any other. And each of the different selections results
in all ranges of rewards, from positive gains to negative losses.
Selection and reward are thus inherent ingredients of all our
lives and the way we lead them (Allport, 1987).
To produce selective behavior, multiple, inter-related pro-
cesses integrate numerous sources of information. One of the
challenges is that these processes unfold over different
timeframes (e.g., Chapman et al., 2015b; Welsh, Neyedli, &
Tremblay, 2013). Therefore, in a laboratory setting, if these
processes are only observed during one point or snapshot
during the selection process, the observation could appear to
reflect “attention” or “intention” or “decision making and re-
ward.” The synthetic approach proposed here also rectifies
and makes explicit that reward and selection history are
intertwined subjects, but likely reflect multiple processes that
contribute to goal-oriented behavior. For example, the syn-
thetic approach can account for harm avoidance.
Specifically, harmful stimuli should receive priority process-
ing for detection, yet the organism should move away from
these stimuli. The primitive neural circuits for reward/
approach and harm/avoid processes diverge early in evolu-
tionary history, providing a process-based account for diver-
gent findings regarding positive and negative value-based
stimuli. Likewise, the synthetic approach explains why sensi-
tivity to different features of objects depends on the action
context (Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; Craighero et al., 1999;
Fagioli et al., 2007; Welsh & Pratt, 2008) – because the con-
text determines which action-centered parietal stream, with its
idiosyncratic representation of the external world, is being
selectively invigorated at a given time.
One of the great conundrums in experimental psychology
and neuroscience is exactly how all of these streams of infor-
mation diverge from initial sensory areas and then converge to
produce action. Working backwards from what researchers
observe in behavior, it is known that generally only one
goal-directed movement is performed at a time, though more
than one might be simultaneously represented (e.g., Cisek &
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Kalaska, 2005). As discussed in the section on evolutionary
adaptations, we advocate for a parallel competitive structure
with winner-take-all dynamics resolving to produce a single
action for each action system (e.g., hand and eye). Of course,
much of the detail about how this occurs is an open question
and beyond the scope of this article. What we hope to empha-
size here is the synthetic approach to understanding how com-
plex sensory information is transformed into action. The cor-
ollary argument is that progress is hindered when we appeal to
or attempt to apply catch-all terms like “attention.” Thus, rath-
er than saying that an individual “pays more attention to a
physically salient stimulus,” one should make an attempt to
understand the mechanism by which physical salience trans-
lates to more efficient processing and behavior. Instead of
arguing that rewarding stimuli “demand more attention,” pro-
vide a description of how a particular reward is associated
with a particular target, and how, perhaps even more astound-
ingly, the cognitive system/brain then recalls this association
in a fraction of a second to guide behavior on a subsequent
trial. Experiment to figure out how and why visual informa-
tion presented at a location selected for action is amplified,
rather than passing the finding off as “just attention.” Hence,
turn to the mechanisms that we understand and try to re-create
the behavior that cognitive and neural scientists are interested
in. If that approach turns out to be successful, there will be no
need for undefinable concepts like attention, either in describ-
ing the explanandum or in describing the explanans.
The synthetic approach we suggest here might appear re-
ductionist. On the one hand, we emphasize that the approach
we propose does not favor neural over functional explana-
tions. True cognitive neuroscience relies on the idea that good
theories should take both neural and functional constraints
into account, so that neural and functional theories do not
contradict each other. This does not imply, and actually logi-
cally undermines, the sometimes observed tendency to con-
sider neural explanations as somehow more fundamental or
causal than functional explanations. Even though many of our
examples referred to neural findings and accounts, and even
though our evolutionary reasoning was couched mainly in
neural terms, we do not advocate any primacy of neural over
functional explanations, and have strived to provide evidence
from both approaches. On the other hand, however, we fully
subscribe to the assumption that good theories in cognitive
psychology and the cognitive neurosciences come from test-
able hypotheses of how an observed phenomenon (the
explanandum) is produced by its underlying mechanisms
(the explanans), irrespective of whether these mechanisms
are described in neural or functional terms. In contrast to
mainstream research, our synthetic approach requires the the-
orist to reconstruct a phenomenon from well-understood basic
mechanisms, rather than analyzing the phenomenon into
pieces. Our expectation is that this synthetic/constructivist ap-
proach will eventually reveal that our original ways to
delineate the phenomena we aim to explain were misleading,
and we feel that this is in particular true for the concept of
attention. Hence, we argue that, in contrast to James’s (1890)
assertion, no one knows, or can ever know, exactly what at-
tention is.
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